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A Reasonable Alternative to the Reasonable 
Alternative Design Requirement in Products 
Liability Law: A Look at Pennsylvania 
Andrew Meade* 
The manner in which design defects should be defined has caused more controversy than any 
other area of products liability law. The Restatement (Third) defines a product design as 
defective when the foreseeable risks of harm from using a product could have been avoided if 
the manufacturer had used a reasonable alternative design. This definition departs from the 
Restatement (Second), which defines defective products as unreasonably dangerous if the 
product fails to meet the expectations of consumers. Without so stating, the Restatement (Third) 
essentially changes products liability law from a regime of strict liability to one of negligence. 
The debate is most unsettled in Pennsylvania. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court currently 
follows the approach of the Restatement (Second), holding that negligence has no place in 
determining whether a product is defective and, instead, modeling liability based on consumer 
expectations. In 2007, however, the Third Circuit predicted that the Pennsylvania Supreme 
Court would adopt the Restatement (Third) and apply a fault-based standard to determine 
liability in products liability cases. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court granted certiorari in a case 
to decide whether it should apply the Restatement (Third); however, in 2009, it dismissed the 
appeal as improvidently granted. As a result, the products liability law in Pennsylvania is in flux. 
I argue that instead of following either of the Restatements, courts should apply strict liability, in 
which manufacturers are liable for foreseeable harm caused by their products, regardless of 
whether the product was deemed “defective.” Although defect will not serve as a limitation on 
liability, manufacturers will be protected under my proposal by the affirmative defenses of 
negligent use or assumption of risk. By eliminating the elusive concept of defect from products 
liability, liability will be more predictable and will better reflect the costs of product use. 
 
 * J.D. Candidate, University of California, Hastings College of the Law, 2011; M.S. Pace 
University, 2006; B.A., Lewis & Clark College, 2004. Thank you, Professor John Diamond, for your 
help and inspiration throughout this endeavor. I would also like to thank the Hastings Law Journal 
editors for their hard work in editing this piece and Volume 62 Editor-in-Chief, Sara B. Tosdal, for her 
devotion to the Hastings Law Journal. Finally, I would like to congratulate and thank the 2010 world 
champion San Francisco Giants for a wonderful season. 
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The manner in which design defects should be defined has 
generated more discussion and caused more controversy than any other 
area of products liability law.1 Defining design defects was the most 
 
 1. David G. Owen, Design Defect Ghosts, 74 Brook. L. Rev. 927, 927 (2009). 
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explosive issue surrounding the drafting and adoption of the 
Restatement (Third) of Torts: Products Liability (“Restatement 
(Third)”).2 Now, more than ten years after its publication in 1998, neither 
courts nor scholars agree on the proper definition for design defects.3 
Rather, the controversy seems to have increased, as disagreement exists 
over the extent to which the Restatement (Third) has been adopted by 
the states, whether it should be adopted, and the scope of liability 
imposed once it has been adopted.4 
The controversy surrounding the Restatement (Third) centers on 
section 2, which defines defective product design.5 The Restatement 
(Third) defines a product design as defective when the foreseeable risks 
of harm from using a product could have been minimized or “avoided” if 
the manufacturer had used “a reasonable alternative design.”6 This 
definition departs from the Restatement (Second) of Torts: Products 
Liability (“Restatement (Second)”), which defines defective products as 
unreasonably dangerous if the product fails to meet the expectations of 
consumers, and this failure is in turn unreasonably dangerous to the 
consumer.7 The Restatement (Second) imposes liability even if the seller 
exercises all possible care in the preparation and sale of the product.8 In 
contrast, under the reasonable alternative design requirement of the 
Restatement (Third), liability hinges on the conduct of the 
manufacturer.9 Although the Restatement (Third) does not use either 
term, it essentially alters the products liability regime from a standard of 
strict liability to one of negligence.10 
The debate has taken on a partisan tone. Opponents to the 
Restatement (Third) argue that the shift is anti-consumer and the 
product of a “distinctive pro-defense bias.”11 Proponents, on the other 
hand, argue that the Restatement (Second) bases liability “on the jury’s 
 
 2. Id. 
 3. Id. 
 4. Compare Aaron D. Twerski & James A. Henderson, Jr., Manufacturers’ Liability for 
Defective Product Designs: The Triumph of Risk-Utility, 74 Brook. L. Rev. 1061, 1106–08 & n.203 
(2009) (cataloguing states’ acceptance of the Restatement (Third) and opining that it has struck a 
balance between “sound litigation theory and actual litigation practice” and “will stand the test of 
time”), with Larry S. Stewart, Strict Liability for Defective Product Design: The Quest For a Well-
Ordered Regime, 74 Brook. L. Rev. 1039, 1059 (2009) (“Restatement (Third) missed the mark for 
normative rules in a well-ordered design defect regime. Intended or not, it has been seen as rolling 
back decades of progress and returning to an era of defendant protectionism.”). 
 5. See Owen, supra note 1, at 930. 
 6. Restatement (Third) of Torts: Prods. Liab. § 2 (1998). 
 7. Restatement (Second) of Torts § 402A cmt. g (1965). 
 8. Id. § 402A. 
 9. Restatement (Third) of Torts: Prods. Liab. § 2 (1998). 
 10. See Twerski & Henderson, supra note 4, at 1067; see also Jerry J. Phillips, The Unreasonably 
Unsafe Product and Strict Liability, 72 Tenn. L. Rev. 833, 833–34 (2005). 
 11. Phillips, supra note 10, at 834.  
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whim.”12 At present, the debate is most unsettled in Pennsylvania. The 
Pennsylvania Supreme Court currently follows the approach of the 
Restatement (Second), holding that negligence has no place in 
determining whether a product is defective and, instead, modeling 
liability based on consumer expectations.13 After the publication of the 
Restatement (Third), several justices on the court questioned the utility 
of strict liability for design defects, but did not adopt the Restatement 
(Third).14 In 2007, however, in Berrier v. Simplicity Manufacturing, Inc., 
the Third Circuit predicted that the Pennsylvania Supreme Court, if 
confronted with the issue, would adopt the Restatement (Third) and 
apply a fault-based standard to determine liability in products liability 
cases.15 
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court granted certiorari in Bugosh v. 
I.U. North America, Inc., to decide “[w]hether [it] should apply section 2 
of the Restatement (Third) of Torts in place of section 402A of the 
Restatement (Second) of Torts.”16 However, in the summer of 2009, over 
a two-justice dissent, the court dismissed the appeal as having been 
improvidently granted.17 
As a result, the products liability law in Pennsylvania is in flux. State 
courts are bound by the decision in Azzarello v. Black Bros. Co., and 
must adhere to the Restatement (Second). Federal courts, on the other 
hand, when applying Pennsylvania law, follow the Third Circuit decision 
set forth in Berrier, which applies the Restatement (Third). Thus, 
Pennsylvania provides a stark example of the controversy in defining 
design defects that is raging across the country.18 Moreover, the 
Pennsylvania Supreme Court is likely to settle this difference soon. This 
situation provides an opportunity to clarify the law by taking a clear side 
on the heated debate surrounding design defects. 
I will argue that the Berrier decision and the adoption of the 
Restatement (Third)’s fault-based liability was misguided. Rather than 
advocating an affirmation of the Restatement (Second) as set forth in 
Azzarello, however, I will argue instead that the Pennsylvania Supreme 
Court, when confronted with the opportunity, should apply a form of 
strict liability, in which manufacturers are liable for foreseeable harm 
caused by their products regardless of whether the product was deemed 
 
 12. Twerski & Henderson, supra note 4, at 1067. 
 13. Azzarello v. Black Bros. Co., 391 A.2d 1020, 1026–27 (Pa. 1978). 
 14. Phillips v. Cricket Lighters, 841 A.2d 1000, 1005 (Pa. 2003). In the concurrence, Justice Saylor 
emphasizes that the Restatement (Third) has not yet been adopted in Pennsylvania. Id. at 1012 
(Saylor, J., concurring). 
 15. 563 F.3d 38, 60 (3d Cir. 2009). 
 16. 942 A.2d 897, 897 (Pa. 2008) (per curiam). 
 17. Bugosh v. I.U. N. Am., Inc., 971 A.2d 1228, 1229 (Pa. 2009) (per curiam). 
 18. See Twerski & Henderson, supra note 4, at 1067 (describing conflicting definitions of design 
defect). 
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“defective.” Although defect will not serve as a limitation on liability, 
manufacturers will be adequately protected under my proposal by 
affirmative defenses such as the plaintiff’s negligent use or assumption of 
risk. 
Following this introduction, Part I of this Note outlines the origins 
and history of products liability law, as well as the rationales behind the 
Restatement (Second) and Restatement (Third). Part II analyzes and 
critiques the relevant Pennsylvania case law, specifically the Azzarello 
decision, the Third Circuit’s decision in Berrier, and ultimately, the 
Pennsylvania Supreme Court’s decision to dismiss in Bugosh. Part III 
advocates for a strict products liability regime, in which product 
defectiveness is irrelevant. Finally, this Note concludes with a 
recommendation to the Pennsylvania Supreme Court, which is also 
relevant to other state supreme courts and legislatures across the 
country. 
I.  Origins of Products Liability Law 
A. The Restatement (Second) 
The modern concept of strict products liability was first formally 
introduced in Greenman v. Yuba Power Products, Inc.,19 in 1963 by 
Justice Traynor of the California Supreme Court.20 In Greenman, the 
court held that a “manufacturer is strictly liable . . . when an article he 
places on the market . . . proves to have a defect that causes injury to a 
human being.”21 Strict liability was justified in order to “insure that the 
costs of injuries resulting from defective products are borne by the 
manufacturers that put such products on the market rather than by the 
injured persons who are powerless to protect themselves.”22 
Following the rationale in Greenman, section 402A of the 
Restatement (Second), published in 1965, imposes liability on anyone 
“who sells any product in a defective condition unreasonably dangerous 
to the user or consumer” even if “the seller has exercised all possible 
care in the preparation and sale of his product.”23 The comments to 
section 402A define defective products as those that leave the seller’s 
hands in an unreasonably dangerous condition not contemplated by the 
ordinary consumer.24 
 
 19. 377 P.2d 897 (Cal. 1963). 
 20. Dominick Vetri, Order Out of Chaos: Products Liability Design-Defect Law, 43 U. Rich. L. 
Rev. 1373, 1381 (2009). 
 21. Greenman, 377 P.2d at 900. 
 22. Id. at 901. 
 23. Restatement (Second) of Torts § 402A (1965). 
 24. Id. § 402A cmt. g. 
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Section 402A was adopted throughout the United States.25 Indeed, 
“[n]o single doctrinal common law principle was ever adopted so widely 
and quickly in the United States as strict products liability.”26 However, 
although purportedly embracing strict liability, courts struggled to define 
what exactly made a product defective, thereby triggering strict liability.27 
The difficulty was especially apparent in defining defective product 
designs, and courts used different tests to determine whether a product 
was defective.28 
1. Consumer Expectations Test 
Initially, after states adopted the Restatement (Second), the 
consumer expectations test became the dominant test utilized by the 
courts.29 Relying on the comments to section 402A, courts generally held 
that a product was defective if it “perform[ed] less safely than an 
ordinary consumer would expect.”30 Generally, courts imposed liability 
based on objective consumer expectations rather than using a subjective 
standard;31 however, some courts examined the subjective expectations of 
the actual consumer.32 Whether employing an objective or subjective 
standard of the consumer expectations test, products were deemed 
defective regardless of the conduct of manufacturers.33 
The consumer expectations test proved to be ineffective in many 
situations. Specifically, the test failed to protect consumers from products 
with open and obvious dangers, because consumers could not have any 
reasonable expectation of safety.34 Therefore, sellers of unreasonably 
dangerous products would escape liability even though the danger of the 
product could be reduced or eliminated through an alternative design.35 
In addition to open and obvious dangers, the courts encountered 
problems identifying whose expectations should apply in cases where the 
 
 25. John L. Diamond, Eliminating the “Defect” in Design Strict Products Liability Theory, 
34 Hastings L.J. 529, 533–34 (1983). 
 26. See Vetri, supra note 20, at 1374. 
 27. Diamond, supra note 25, at 529. 
 28. See Vetri, supra note 20, at 1387–408. 
 29. Id. at 1386. 
 30. Id. at 1387. 
 31. Id. 
 32. See, e.g., Pridgett v. Jackson Iron & Metal Co., 253 So. 2d 837, 843 (Miss. 1971); Garrett v. 
Nissen Corp., 498 P.2d 1359, 1363 (N.M. 1972); Young v. Tide Craft, Inc., 242 S.E.2d 671, 680 
(S.C. 1978). 
 33. See Diamond, supra note 25, at 535. 
 34. See Vetri, supra note 20, at 1387. 
 35. For example, an industrial punch press that omitted a safety guard would likely be considered 
an open and obvious danger. Id. at 1388. Therefore under the consumer expectations test, the omission 
would not amount to a defective design even though a safety guard would substantially reduce or 
eliminate the danger at a slight cost. Id. Vetri notes that some states employed the consumer 
expectations test normatively—rather than factually—and inquired into what level of safety ordinary 
consumers should expect from a product design. Id. A normative approach necessarily considers 
reasonableness of the design. Id. 
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consumer controls the safety of other persons such as children, patients, 
employees, or bystanders.36 In certain cases, users and bystanders have a 
conflict of interest pertaining to the safety of a product. For example, 
some individuals buy sport-utility vehicles, because they believe them to 
be safer due to their weight, size, and height.37 However, the higher 
bumpers on sport-utility vehicles present a vehicle-penetration risk to 
occupants of other cars in collisions.38 To address bystander injuries, 
some courts expanded the notion of consumer to include bystanders, or 
changed the perspective from what an ordinary consumer expects to 
what an ordinary consumer should expect in terms of safety.39 
Finally, both courts and commentators complained that consumer 
expectations were too vague, especially in cases involving complex 
products.40 In cases involving allegedly defective product designs, 
“consumers do not [always] have clear expectations as to how a product 
will perform when subjected to a broad range of uses.”41 Additionally, 
because consumer expectations may vary, a manufacturer could 
potentially be subjected to liability no matter how the product is 
designed.42 
2. The Risk-Utility Test 
Frustrated in part by the potential shortcomings of the consumer 
expectations test, some courts undertook a risk-utility analysis to 
determine product defectiveness.43 Under a risk-utility test, courts 
balanced the danger of the product, measured by the gravity and 
likelihood of harm caused by the product, with the utility of the 
product.44 
Using a risk-utility balancing test to determine product 
defectiveness can take on different forms. An influential article by Dean 
John Wade identified a list of factors that could be considered by courts 
in determining design defectiveness:  
  (1) The usefulness and desirability of the product—its utility to the 
user and to the public as a whole. 
  (2) The safety aspects of the product—the likelihood that it will 
cause injury, and the probable seriousness of the injury. 
  (3) The availability of a substitute product which would meet the 
same need and not be as unsafe. 
  (4) The manufacturer’s ability to eliminate the unsafe character of 
 
 36. Owen, supra note 1, at 942. 
 37.  Vetri, supra note 20, at 1389. 
 38. Id. 
 39. See id. at 1390–92. 
 40. Owen, supra note 1, at 943. 
 41. Twerski & Henderson, supra note 4, at 1100. 
 42. Id. at 1100–01. 
 43.  See Owen, supra note 1, at 945. 
 44. See Vetri, supra note 20, at 1394. 
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the product without impairing its usefulness or making it too expensive 
to maintain its utility. 
  (5) The user’s ability to avoid danger by the exercise of care in the 
use of the product. 
  (6) The user’s anticipated awareness of the dangers inherent in the 
product and their avoidability, because of general public knowledge of 
the obvious condition of the product, or of the existence of suitable 
warnings or instructions. 
  (7) The feasibility, on the part of the manufacturer, of spreading the 
loss by setting the price of the product or carrying liability insurance.45 
The Wade factors have been criticized as overbroad.46 Specifically, 
the first factor was politically unpopular because it “allow[ed] courts to 
second-guess the market as to the desirability of different kinds of 
products.”47 Additionally, the seventh factor—the ability to spread loss—
has been criticized because it “always points to liability.”48 Moreover, 
commentators have argued the third factor—the availability of a 
substitute product—is a necessary element, rather than a factor, in order 
to establish a design defect.49 Without a feasible alternative design, 
finding a product defect would necessarily impose liability on the entire 
product category, something many argue is better left to the legislature.50 
Concerned about establishing liability over an entire category of 
products, some courts required the plaintiff to prove a reasonable 
alternative design was available in order to establish liability.51 However, 
even these courts differed significantly over what constituted sufficient 
proof of a reasonable alternative design.52 Therefore, despite the 
criticism, appellate courts often recited the Wade factors in assessing 
whether a product was defectively designed,53 and as a result, no uniform 
test emerged to assess design defectiveness.54 
In addition to criticisms over what factors should be balanced, 
courts differed in framing the scope of the balancing test. Under a 
method characterized as “macro-balancing” a court compares a product’s 
overall total risk with its overall total utility.55 In contrast, a “micro-
balancing” approach considers the costs and benefits of adopting a 
 
 45. John W. Wade, On the Nature of Strict Tort Liability for Products, 44 Miss. L.J. 825, 837–38 
(1973). 
 46.  Owen, supra note 1, at 955. 
 47. Id. at 956. 
 48. Id. at 958. 
 49. See Twerski & Henderson, supra note 4, at 1096. 
 50. Id. at 1069. 
 51. See Kenneth R. Meyer et al., The Uncertainty Surrounding “Design” in Design Defect Cases, 
76 Def. Couns. J. 428, 428 (2009). 
 52. See id. at 432. 
 53. Owen, supra note 1, at 928–29. 
 54. Id. at 955. 
 55. Id. at 959. 
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particular alternative design feature proposed by a plaintiff.56 For 
example, if a plaintiff is injured by a motorized boat propeller and 
proposes an alternative design in which the propeller was equipped with 
a propeller guard, the inquiry would only consider the balance of costs 
and benefits resulting from adding a propeller guard—not the broader 
risks of motorized boat propellers, or generally, the risks of motor-
powered boats.57 
Despite the widespread adoption of section 402A of the 
Restatement (Second), courts struggled to apply the standard in design 
defect cases, and little uniformity existed between the states.58 Some 
courts applied the consumer expectations test; some applied versions of 
the risk-utility test, and others applied a combination of the two.59 The 
varying interpretations of the Restatement (Second) paved the way for 
the Restatement (Third)’s attempt to codify and update thirty years of 
products liability law.60 
B. The Restatement (Third) 
The Restatement (Third), published in 1998, sought to describe a set 
of “well-ordered” rules to guide courts and practitioners in products 
liability cases.61 Specifically, the Restatement (Third) divides the concept 
of product defect into three separate subcategories: manufacturing 
defects, failures to warn, and design defects.62 
1. Manufacturing Defects 
Manufacturing defects are defined as a physical departure from a 
product’s intended design.63 Manufacturing defects involve a mistake in 
the production process and therefore, tend to occur in only a small 
percentage of units in a product line.64 Like the Restatement (Second), 
the Restatement (Third) imposes liability on sellers of products with 
manufacturing defects, even though all possible care is exercised in the 
preparation and marketing of the product.65 
The retention of strict liability for manufacturing defects was, for 
the most part, uncontroversial.66 Manufacturing defects are generally 
 
 56. Id. at 960–61. 
 57. Id. 
 58. See Vetri, supra note 20, at 1408. 
 59. See Twerski & Henderson, supra note 4, at 1072. 
 60. Larry S. Stewart, Strict Liability for Defective Product Design: The Quest for a Well-Ordered 
Regime, 74 Brook. L. Rev. 1039, 1039 (2009). 
 61. Id. 
 62. Vetri, supra note 20, at 1406. 
 63. Restatement (Third) of Torts: Prods. Liab. § 2 (1998). 
 64. John G. Culhane, Real and Imagined Effects of Statutes Restricting the Liability of 
Nonmanufacturing Sellers of Defective Products, 95 Dick. L. Rev. 287, 309 n.84 (1991). 
 65. Restatement (Third) of Torts: Prods. Liab. § 2 (1998). 
 66. See Twerski & Henderson, supra note 4, at 1062–64; see also Alex J. Grant, New Theories of 
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easy to identify, because they differ from the rest of the product line.67 
Liability is justified either by applying the consumer expectations test, 
where consumers expect a product to function like other products, or by 
applying the risk-utility test, where there is a clearly feasible alternative 
product that functions properly.68 
2. Failure to Warn 
Under the Restatement (Third), a product could also be “defective 
because of inadequate instructions or warnings.”69 “Failure to warn” 
defects are reserved for “when the foreseeable risks of harm posed by 
the product could have been reduced or avoided by the provision of 
reasonable instructions, or warnings by the seller or other distributor.”70 
Unlike manufacturing defects, the Restatement (Third) implements 
a negligence, fault-based standard for defect due to failure to warn. A 
plaintiff must show both that a warning was necessary and that such a 
warning was either absent or inadequate.71 While warnings may be taken 
into account in determining liability, the Restatement (Third) expressly 
states that warnings are not substitutes for a safer design.72 
3. Design Defects 
Design defects, as defined by the Restatement (Third), exist “when 
the foreseeable risks of harm posed by the product could have been 
reduced or avoided by the adoption of a reasonable alternative design by 
the seller . . . and the omission of the alternative design renders the 
product not reasonably safe.”73 
The Restatement (Third) expressly states, “consumer expectations 
do not constitute an independent standard for judging the defectiveness 
of product designs.”74 The foreseeable risks and reasonable alternative 
design requirements essentially reset the standard of liability for 
defective product designs from strict liability to negligence.75 Although 
consumer expectations remain relevant when evaluating a potential 
design defect using the risk-utility test, the Restatement (Third) is clear 
that a plaintiff cannot establish a defective design without showing a 
reasonable alternative design.76 
By expressly disregarding the consumer expectations test as a 
 
Cigarette Liability: The Restatement (Third) of Torts and the Viability of a Design Defect Cause of 
Action, 3 Cornell J.L. & Pub. Pol’y 343, 352 (1994). 
 67. Culhane, supra note 64. 
 68. Twerski & Henderson, supra note 4, at 1063–64. 
 69. Restatement (Third) of Torts: Prods. Liab. § 2 (1998). 
 70. Id. § 2 cmt. i. 
 71. Stewart, supra note 60, at 1055. 
 72. Restatement (Third) of Torts: Prods. Liab. § 2 cmt. l (1998). 
 73. Id. § 2(b). 
 74. Id. § 2 cmt. g. 
 75. Id. 
 76. Id. 
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sufficient basis for liability, the Restatement (Third) instead advocates 
using the fault-based risk-utility approach.77 Manufacturers would not be 
liable for products unless the plaintiff proved they were designed 
unreasonably—namely they could have been designed with a feasible 
and safer alternative design.78 Like Judge Learned Hand’s algebraic 
concept stating that negligence exists if the burden of undertaking 
precautions is less than the probability of expected harm,79 under a risk-
utility analysis, a product would be considered defective if the burden of 
designing a safer product was less than the magnitude and probability of 
harm caused by the existing product.80 
In addition to hinging liability on the manufacturer’s conduct, the 
reasonable alternative design requirement also serves to guard against 
dangerous products being deemed categorically defective.81 For example, 
alcoholic beverages pose significant health risks when consumed in 
excess; employing a risk-utility analysis, a court could potentially 
determine the risks of alcohol outweigh its utility.82 However, removing 
the alcohol, which would undoubtedly make the product safer, is not a 
reasonable alternative design, because it would also deprive consumers 
of the utility derived from alcohol.83 Therefore, the reasonable 
alternative design requirement guards against categorical products 
liability, which the Restatement (Third) deems to be better left to the 
legislature, rather than the courts.84 
In the comments, the Restatement (Third) preserved the possibility 
that in the future, certain categories of products might be sufficiently 
dangerous and of such minimal social utility that they would be deemed 
defective, even if no alternative design was available.85 Despite 
preserving the possibility of categorical liability, the Restatement (Third) 
limited the possibility to products that were not “generally available and 
widely used and consumed”86 and attempted to make the possibility of 
categorical products liability as narrow as possible.87 
 
 77. Twerski & Henderson, supra note 4, at 1065. 
 78. Id. at 1069. 
 79. Negligence = B < P x L, where B = burden; P = costs of adopting precautions against 
foreseeable, accidental loss; L = probable magnitude or expected cost of such a loss if it does occur. 
United States v. Caroll Towing Co., 159 F.2d 160, 173 (2d Cir. 1947). 
 80. Twerski & Henderson, supra note 4, at 1065. 
 81. Id. at 1070. 
 82. Id. at 1069. 
 83. Id. 
 84. Id.  
 85. Restatement (Third) of Torts: Prods. Liab. § 2, cmt. e (1998). 
 86. Id. § 2, cmt. d. 
 87. Twerski & Henderson, supra note 4, at 1071. 
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C. Response to the Restatement (Third): Current Law in the 
States 
The Restatement (Third)’s position on manufacturing defects is 
generally uncontroversial.88 While the provisions regarding defects for a 
failure to warn garnered significant commentary and criticism,89 no issue 
within the Restatement (Third) pertaining to products liability has 
generated as much controversy as the proposed standard to define design 
defectiveness.90 
The defense bar generally praised the change.91 Manufacturers 
generally criticized the consumer expectations test, arguing that while 
consumers could expect products to be built according to their design, 
they were uninformed regarding all the considerations involved in 
designing a particular product.92 Additionally, proponents of the 
Restatement (Third) argued that the majority of courts were already 
employing fault-based standards in products liability cases.93 In contrast, 
the plaintiff’s bar raised concerns that the change failed to protect 
consumers and was enacted to serve the interests of defendants.94 
Furthermore, critics contend the Restatement (Third) departs from the 
standards employed by a majority of states and amounts to a “regression 
in the law.”95 
After the enactment of the Restatement (Third), the debate played 
out in courtrooms across the country. In Potter v. Chicago Pneumatic 
Tool Co., the Connecticut Supreme Court expressly rejected the 
Restatement (Third), stating “that the majority of jurisdictions do not 
impose upon plaintiffs an absolute requirement to prove a feasible 
alternative design.”96 The Connecticut Supreme Court criticized the 
Restatement (Third) and concluded that a feasible alternative design 
requirement placed an “undue burden on plaintiffs that might preclude 
otherwise valid claims from jury consideration.”97 
However, the Potter decision also recognized criticisms of the 
consumer expectations test and chose instead to adopt a “modified 
formulation of the consumer expectation test,” in which design 
defectiveness involving “complex” products would hinge on a risk-utility 
 
 88. William M. Brown, Déjà Vu All Over Again: The Exodus From Contraceptive Research and 
How to Reverse It, 40 Brandeis L.J. 1, 18 (2001). 
 89. Stewart, supra note 60, at 1055–57. 
 90. Twerski & Henderson, supra note 4, at 1062. 
 91. See Stewart, supra note 60, at 1040. 
 92. Id. at 1042. 
 93. Michael D. Green, The Unappreciated Congruity of the Second and Third Torts Restatements 
on Design Defects, 74 Brook. L. Rev. 807, 807 (2009). 
 94. See Stewart, supra note 60, at 1059. 
 95. Id. at 1040. 
 96. 694 A.2d 1319, 1331 (Conn. 1997). 
 97. Id. at 1332. 
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analysis.98 Connecticut essentially adopted a two-pronged test for 
determining design defects, in which liability could be established by 
demonstrating that the product failed to meet consumer expectations, or 
that the product failed to meet risk-utility standards.99 Arizona,100 
Alaska,101 California,102 Florida,103 Hawaii,104 Ohio,105 Oregon,106 Puerto 
Rico,107 Tennessee,108 and Washington109 all employ a similar two-pronged 
approach to determine design defect.110 
Other states rejected the Restatement (Third) and risk-utility 
analysis in its entirety and insisted on applying the consumer 
expectations test.111 Kansas,112 Maryland,113 Nebraska,114 Oklahoma,115 and 
Wisconsin116 all employ the consumer expectations test as the sole 
standard to determine design defect. 
Other courts purported to reject the Restatement (Third), while 
nevertheless requiring the plaintiff to prove a reasonable alternative 
design.117 In Mikolajczyk v. Ford Motor Co., the Illinois Supreme Court 
rejected the Restatement (Third), but held that risk-utility evidence may 
be introduced by either party to show whether a product was defectively 
designed.118 Although the Illinois court ostensibly rejected the 
Restatement (Third) requirement of a feasible alternative design, where 
a defendant introduced risk-utility evidence, the plaintiff would be 
required to prove the existence of a reasonable alternative design, or that 
the entire product category was defective.119 Although not technically 
requiring proof of a reasonable alternative design, Colorado,120 
 
 98. Id. at 1333–34. 
 99. Twerski & Henderson, supra note 4, at 1098.  
 100. See Dart v. Wiebe Mfg., Inc., 709 P.2d 876, 881–82 (Ariz. 1985) (en banc). 
 101. Smith v. Ingersoll-Rand Co., 14 P.3d 990, 994 (Alaska 2000). 
 102. Barker v. Lull Eng’g Co., 573 P.2d 443, 457–58 (Cal. 1978). 
 103. Force v. Ford Motor Co., 879 So. 2d 103, 105 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2004). 
 104. Acoba v. Gen. Tire Co., 986 P.2d 288, 304 (Haw. 1999). 
 105. Knitz v. Minster Mach., Co., 432 N.E.2d 814, 818 (Ohio 1982). 
 106. McCathern v. Toyota Motor Corp., 23 P.3d 320, 329–30 (Or. 2001). 
 107. Collazo-Santiago v. Toyota Motor Corp., 149 F.3d 23, 25–26 (1st Cir. 1998). 
 108. Jackson v. Gen. Motors Corp., 60 S.W.3d 800, 803 (Tenn. 2001). 
 109. Bruns v. PACCAR, Inc., 890 P.2d 469, 474 (Wash. Ct. App. 1995). 
 110. See Smith v. Ingersoll-Rand Co. 14 P.3d 990, 994 (Alaska 2000); Dart v. Wiebe Mfg., Inc., 
709 P.2d 876, 881–82 (Ariz. 1985) (en banc); see also Twerski & Henderson, supra note 4, at 1098–1100 
& nn. 156–66.  
 111. Twerski & Henderson, supra note 4, at 1104. 
 112. Delaney v. Deere & Co., 999 P.2d 930, 934 (Kan. 2000). 
 113. Halliday v. Sturm, Ruger & Co., 792 A.2d 1145, 1154 (Md. 2002). 
 114. Haag v. Bongers, 589 N.W.2d 318, 329 (Neb. 1999). 
 115. Kirkland v. Gen. Motors Corp., 521 P.2d 1353, 1360 (Okla. 1974). 
 116. Vincer v. Ether Williams All-Aluminum Swimming Pool Co., 230 N.W.2d 794, 798 (Wis. 1975). 
 117. Twerski & Henderson, supra note 4, at 1073–74.  
 118. 901 N.E.2d 329, 347 (Ill. 2008). 
 119. Id.; see also Twerski & Henderson, supra note 4, at 1094–96. 
 120. Union Supply Co. v. Pust, 583 P.2d 276, 286 (Colo. 1978). 
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Minnesota,121 New Hampshire,122 New Mexico,123 and Nevada124 also allow 
risk-utility evidence to be introduced as a factor to consider in the design 
defect analysis, thereby essentially replacing the consumer expectations 
test. 
Lastly, some courts embraced the Restatement (Third).125 
Alabama,126 Delaware,127 District of Columbia,128 Georgia,129 Indiana,130 
Iowa,131 Kentucky,132 Maine,133 Massachusetts,134 Michigan,135 Montana,136 
Rhode Island,137 South Carolina,138 Virginia,139 and West Virginia140 all 
require proof of a reasonable alternative design in order to establish 
product defect. 
Despite the ambitious effort of the Restatement (Third), consensus 
has not emerged on the appropriate legal test for design defects. The lack 
of uniformity is especially glaring in comparison to the remarkable 
(initial) success of the Restatement (Second). In an age of interstate and 
international product shipments, greater uniformity in products liability 
law is necessary. 
II.  The Pennsylvania Story 
The debate over the appropriate standard to define design defects is 
most unsettled in Pennsylvania, because products liability law in 
Pennsylvania is in flux. Pennsylvania state courts are bound by the 
Azzarello decision, which explicitly adopted the Restatement (Second).141 
However, in Bugosh, the Third Circuit predicted the Pennsylvania 
Supreme Court would adopt the Restatement (Third), and federal 
district courts have followed its holding when applying Pennsylvania 
 
 121. Holm v. Sponco Mfg., Inc., 324 N.W.2d 207, 212–13 (Minn. 1982). 
 122. Vautour v. Body Masters Sports Indus., Inc., 784 A.2d 1178, 1184 (N.H. 2001). 
 123. Brooks v. Beech Aircraft Corp., 902 P.2d 54, 61–62 (N.M. 1995). 
 124. McCourt v. J.C. Penney Co., 734 P.2d 696, 698 (Nev. 1987). 
 125. Twerski & Henderson, supra note 4, at 1080–81. 
 126. Gen. Motors Corp. v. Edwards, 482 So. 2d 1176, 1191 (Ala. 1985). 
 127. Nacci v. Volkswagen of Am., Inc., 325 A.2d 617, 620 (Del. Super. Ct. 1974). 
 128. Warner Fruehauf Trailer Co. v. Boston, 654 A.2d 1272, 1276 (D.C. 1995). 
 129. Banks v. ICI Ams., Inc., 450 S.E.2d 671, 674 (Ga. 1994). 
 130. Jackson v. Warrum, 535 N.E.2d 1207, 1220 (Ind. Ct. App. 1989). 
 131. Wright v. Brooke Group Ltd., 652 N.W.2d 159, 169, 181–82 (Iowa 2002). 
 132. Burke v. U-Haul Int’l, Inc., 501 F. Supp. 2d 930, 933 (W.D. Ky. 2007); Toyota Motor Corp., v. 
Gregory, 136 S.W.3d 35, 42 (Ky. 2004). 
 133. St. Germain v. Husqvarna Corp., 544 A.2d 1283, 1285 (Me. 1988). 
 134. Johnson v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 122 F. Supp. 2d 194, 207 (D. Mass. 2000). 
 135. Prentis v. Yale Mfg. Co., 365 N.W.2d 176, 184 (Mich. 1984). 
 136. Rix v. Gen. Motors Corp., 723 P.2d 195, 202–03 (Mont. 1986). 
 137. Buonanno III v. Colmar Belting Co., 733 A.2d 712, 717 (R.I. 1999). 
 138. Bragg v. Hi-Ranger Inc., 462 S.E.2d 321, 330 (S.C. Ct. App. 1995). 
 139. Allen v. Minnstar, Inc., 8 F.3d 1470, 1479 (10th Cir. 1993). 
 140. Morningstar v. Black & Decker Mfg. Co., 253 S.E.2d 666 (W. Va. 1979). 
 141. Azzarello v. Black Bros. Co., 391 A.2d 1020, 1022 (Pa. 1978). 
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law.142 In a separate case, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court certified the 
question “whether this Court should apply section 2 of the Restatement 
(Third) of Torts in place of section 402A of the Restatement (Second) of 
Torts,” but the case was dismissed as improvidently granted.143 
A. The AZZARELLO Decision 
Modern Pennsylvania products liability law is based on the 
Azzarrello decision. In Azzarello, the plaintiff’s right hand was pinched 
in a coating machine made and sold by Black Brothers, Inc.144 Azzarello 
sued Black Brothers, “relying solely on the theory of strict liability under 
Section 402A of the Restatement (Second).”145 Black Brothers alleged 
Azzarello’s employer’s negligence was the sole or contributing cause of 
Azzarello’s injuries.146 
The trial court instructed the jury that liability depended on finding 
the product “unreasonably dangerous.”147 The jury returned a verdict for 
the manufacturer, though not for the employer of the other defendant 
who appealed.148 The Pennsylvania Supreme Court held that whether a 
product was unreasonably dangerous was a question of law to be decided 
by the judge—not the jury.149 Instead, once a product was deemed 
unreasonably dangerous, the jury would then decide whether the 
evidence supported the allegations in the complaint—specifically, 
whether the product failed to meet consumer expectations.150 
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court adhered to the Restatement 
(Second), but determined it was meant “to provide guidance for the 
bench and bar, and not to illuminate the issues for laymen.”151 The court 
compared the concept of strict liability with that of negligence, in which 
the court may employ the Hand Formula in determining negligence, but 
simply instruct jurors to consider actions of the reasonably prudent 
man.152 Concluding that “unreasonably dangerous” was an inadequate 
standard to guide a jury on the question of defect, the court held, “It is 
clear that the term ‘unreasonably dangerous’ has no place in the 
instructions to a jury as to the question of ‘defect.’”153 The court stressed 
that a manufacturer is the guarantor of product safety and must provide, 
 
 142. E.g., Hoffman v. Paper Converting Mach. Co., 694 F. Supp. 2d 359, 365 (E.D. Pa. 2010). 
 143. Bugosh v. I.U. N. Am., Inc., 942 A.2d 897 (Pa. 2008) (per curiam). 
 144. Azzarello, 391 A.2d at 1022. 
 145. Id. 
 146. Id. 
 147. Id. 
 148. Id. 
 149. Id. at 1026. 
 150. Id. 
 151. Id.  
 152. Id. 
 153. Id. at 1027. 
Meade_62-HLJ-155.doc (Do Not Delete) 1/7/2011 12:02 PM 
170 HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 62:155 
along with the product, every element necessary to make it safe for its 
intended use.154 If a jury determined that the product did not meet 
consumer expectations and caused the injury, liability would 
automatically follow.155 Therefore, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court 
granted a new trial to Azzarello’s employer.156 
The Azzarello decision paralleled other states in adopting the 
Restatement (Second); however, unlike most other states that submit the 
question of whether a product was unreasonably dangerous to the jury, 
the Pennsylvania Supreme Court held that the question whether a 
product was unreasonably dangerous was one of law.157 The court 
indicated that a judge should employ a risk utility analysis and consider 
“social policy” to determine whether a product was “unreasonably 
dangerous.”158 However the court did not require the plaintiff to show a 
reasonable alternative design before considering a product unreasonably 
dangerous.159 Once a product was determined unreasonably dangerous by 
a judge, the jury would determine whether the product was defective 
based on consumer expectations, or whether the product “left the 
supplier’s control lacking any element necessary to make it safe for its 
intended use or possessing any feature that renders it unsafe for the 
intended use.”160 
B. The BERRIER Decision 
Thirty years after the Azzarello decision, in Berrier v. Simplicity 
Manufacturing, Inc., the Third Circuit predicted Pennsylvania would 
abandon the Restatement (Second) and adopt the Restatement (Third) 
in its stead.161 In Berrier, parents of a child who had to have her foot 
amputated after being backed over by a lawn mower sued Simplicity, the 
manufacturer of the lawn mower.162 The Berriers alleged that the 
manufacturer was liable on a theory of negligent design, as well as strictly 
liable on the basis of defective design.163 Specifically, the Berriers claimed 
the product was defectively and negligently designed because it did not 
have any “back-over protection, such as a ‘no mow in reverse’ device or 
roller barriers.”164 
After the Berriers filed their claim in state court, Simplicity 
 
 154. Id. at 1026–27. 
 155. Id. 
 156. Id. at 1027. 
 157. Id. at 1026. 
 158. Id. 
 159. See id. 
 160. Id. at 1027. 
 161. 563 F.3d 38, 40 (3d Cir. 2009). 
 162. Id. at 41. 
 163. Id. 
 164. Id. 
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removed the action to federal court based on diversity jurisdiction.165 
Applying Pennsylvania law, the district court granted summary judgment 
to Simplicity on both of the claims, reasoning that the Berriers could not 
recover because, as a bystander, the injured child was not an intended 
user of the lawn mower.166 The Berriers appealed.167 
The Third Circuit, hearing the appeal, noted Pennsylvania had yet 
to expressly recognize or reject a bystander’s right to recover under 
products liability law.168 In the absence of a controlling decision by the 
state supreme court, a federal court must predict how the highest court 
would decide.169 The Third Circuit proceeded to reverse the district court 
and expressly adopted the Restatement (Third), which permits any 
person harmed by a defective product to recover, regardless of whether 
they were the purchaser or the user of the product.170 
Although its rationale stemmed from predicting the Pennsylvania 
Supreme Court would protect bystanders, the Third Circuit expanded its 
holding to alter all of products liability law. The court concluded that 
“central conceptions borrowed from negligence theory are embedded in 
strict products liability doctrine,” and that the “character of the product 
and the conduct of the manufacturer are largely inseparable.”171 
Curiously, the Third Circuit’s expansive adoption of the 
Restatement (Third) was unnecessary to protect bystanders. Indeed, the 
court based its rationale in part on Miller v. Preitz,172 a Pennsylvania case 
that implied a cause of action for bystanders under section 402A of the 
Restatement (Second).173 The Third Circuit relied on a non-majority 
opinion in Miller that recommended adopting the Restatement (Second) 
in order to eliminate any privity requirement for products liability 
actions.174 
Despite having an independent basis within the Restatement 
(Second) to extend liability to manufacturers for bystander injuries, the 
court predicted the Pennsylvania Supreme Court would abandon the 
Restatement (Second) in its entirety.175 The Third Circuit cited a three-
justice concurrence in Phillips v. Cricket Lighters, which recommended 
abandoning the Restatement (Second) in favor of the Third.176 
 
 165. Id. at 44. 
 166. Id. at 45. 
 167. Id. 
 168. Id. at 46. 
 169. Id. at 45–46. 
 170. Id. at 54. 
 171. Id. at 56. 
 172. 221 A.2d 320 (Pa. 1966). 
 173. Berrier, 563 F.3d at 47. 
 174. Id. (citing Miller, 221 A.2d at 333). 
 175. Id. at 53. 
 176. Id. (citing Phillips v. Cricket Lighters, 841 A.2d 1000, 1018–22 (Pa. 2003) (Saylor, J., 
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Additionally, the court relied on a dissent in Pennsylvania Department of 
General Services v. U.S. Mineral Products,177 in which two justices 
questioned whether foreseeability could be completely separated in strict 
liability cases.178 Thus, between opinions issued in Phillips and Mineral 
Products, the Third Circuit concluded that four of the current 
Pennsylvania justices—enough to overturn Azzarello—voiced support 
for adopting the Restatement (Third).179 
The court justified the departure from existing Pennsylvania law as 
sound policy, stating “the Third Restatement takes a ‘more progressive 
view,’ and far more realistic approach to strict liability when ‘bystanders’ 
are involved,” and recognized “the essential role of risk-utility balancing, 
a concept derived from negligence doctrine, in design defect litigation.”180 
Applying the Restatement (Third), which plainly does not 
distinguish between users and bystanders, the Third Circuit concluded 
the district court erred in granting Simplicity’s motion for summary 
judgment, because it “should not have relied on the ‘intended users’ 
doctrine,” which precluded bystander recovery.181 The court held the 
Berriers were entitled to a trial, because they had proposed several 
reasonable alternative designs.182 Specifically, the Berriers offered 
evidence that lawn mowers employing “no mow in reverse” technology 
or roller guards were examples of safer alternative designs.183 The court 
also reversed the district court on the Berrier negligence claim, 
concluding that Simplicity owed a duty to the Berriers despite the child 
being a bystander.184 Thus, although the court could have utilized the 
Restatement (Second) to protect bystanders, it issued a sweeping 
decision significantly altering Pennsylvania products liability law. 
C. The BUGOSH Certification 
In a separate case, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court certified the 
question “whether this Court should apply Section 2 of the Restatement 
(Third) of Torts in place of Section 402A of the Restatement (Second) of 
Torts.”185 However, in the summer of 2009, the Pennsylvania Supreme 
Court dismissed the appeal as having been improvidently granted.186 
 
concurring)). 
 177. 898 A.2d 590 (Pa. 2006). 
 178. Berrier, 563 F.3d at 53. 
 179. Id. at 57 n.28. 
 180. Id. at 60 (quoting Phillips, 841 A.2d at 1015–16 (Saylor, J., concurring)) (internal quotation 
marks omitted). 
 181. Id. at 60–61. 
 182. Id. at 63–66. 
 183. Id. at 44. 
 184. Id. at 68. 
 185. Bugosh v. I.U. N. Am., Inc., 942 A.2d 897, 897 (Pa. 2008) (per curiam). 
 186. Bugosh v. I.U. N. Am., Inc., 971 A.2d 1228, 1229 (Pa. 2009) (per curiam). 
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In Bugosh, the plaintiff sought to recover on a strict liability claim 
under 402A of the Restatement (Second) based on asbestos exposure.187 
After a jury verdict in favor of the plaintiff, the asbestos manufacturer 
appealed, arguing that the Restatement (Third) replaced the 
Restatement (Second), and that the plaintiffs failed to offer a reasonable 
alternative design.188 
In a dissenting opinion to the dismissal, Justice Saylor of the 
Pennsylvania Supreme Court, argued the Azzarello decision left 
Pennsylvania products liability law “beset by ‘pervasive ambiguities and 
inconsistencies’” and did not provide lower courts with guidance on how 
to treat cases employing reasonableness and foreseeability standards.189 
The dissent noted the national controversy over defining design 
defects.190 Indeed, the appellee’s brief reiterated criticisms that the 
Restatement (Third) was an “inappropriate attempt at tort reform 
orchestrated by members of the business and insurance communities.”191 
Nevertheless, the dissent argued that a strict, categorical divide between 
strict-liability and negligence concepts was impossible “in light of the tort 
system’s largely open-ended damages scheme, and the impossibility of 
designing products incapable of contributing to human injury.”192 
The dissent criticized Azzarrello as “unduly disrupting product 
investment and innovation” and justified the sweeping policy shift in the 
absence of legislative action because Azzarello “has taken our 
jurisprudence too far from the legitimate home of tort law in the concept 
of corrective justice.”193 Therefore, risk-utility balancing, “an approach 
derived from negligence theory,” was a rational and necessary limiting 
principle.194 Accordingly, “the Court should disavow Azzarrello” and 
“adopt Sections 1 and 2 of the Third Restatement in its stead.”195 In the 
view of the dissent, availability of a reasonable alternative design was a 
necessary component of establishing liability. 
Despite the forcefulness of the dissent, it only garnered two votes, 
and the majority did not provide a reason for dismissing Bugosh. 
Therefore, Azzarrello and the Restatement (Second) remains good law 
in Pennsylvania courts. However, federal courts, when applying 
Pennsylvania law, have followed the Berrier decision. The split likely will 
 
 187. Id. (Saylor, J., dissenting). 
 188. Id. 
 189. Id. at 1231–32 (quoting Brief for Products Liability Counsel, Inc. as Amicus Curiae in Support 
of Appellants at 28, Bugosh, 971 A.2d 1228 (No. 7 WAP 2008), 2008 WL 6011304). 
 190. Id. at 1231. 
 191. Id. at 1232 (citing Brief of Appellee Judith R. Bugosh at 24, Bugosh, 971 A.2d 1228 (No. 7 
WAP 2008), 2008 WL 6011308). 
 192. Id. at 1234. 
 193. Id. at 1239–40. 
 194. See id. at 1230. 
 195. Id. at 1244. 
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not last long. The fundamental principle of Erie Railroad Co. v. 
Tompkins was to avoid forum shopping between state and federal courts 
based on substantive law.196 The confusion that remains as a result of the 
Bugosh dismissal provides an opportunity to clarify the law by taking a 
clear side on the heated debate surrounding design defects. 
III.  Finding the Appropriate Standard: A Proposal for Change 
The battle over the appropriate products liability regime is not 
isolated to Pennsylvania.197 Products liability law across the entire 
country is in need of greater uniformity. The division is telling: Neither 
the Restatement (Second) nor Restatement (Third) has successfully 
defined defective product designs. A different approach is overdue. This 
Part argues that liability for injuries caused by products should not hinge 
on the elusive concept of defect. Rather, liability should be established if 
any product fails to perform as intended—or the foreseeable use of a 
product causes an injury. Although defect would no longer serve as a 
limit on liability for injuries caused by products, foreseeable use and 
proximate cause will limit unwarranted liability for manufacturers. 
Additionally, defendant-manufacturers will be able to rely on a robust 
defense of negligent use or assumption of risk to curb liability. Once a 
defendant has proven negligent use of a product or assumption of risk by 
the plaintiff, the plaintiff may only recover by showing a safer, 
reasonable alternative design was available and could have prevented the 
injury. 
The proposed products liability regime incorporates aspects of the 
consumer expectations test, derived from the Restatement (Second), in 
determining foreseeable use of a product; but it relies on the 
Restatement (Third) and the reasonable alternative design requirement 
to establish liability once a defense has been established. 
A. The Proposal 
My proposed products liability regime can be separated into three 
parts: 
(1) A plaintiff, injured by a product in the course of its foreseeable 
use, establishes a prima facie case for strict products liability. 
(2) The defendant can rebut the prima facie case through an 
affirmative defense, either by showing that the product was used 
negligently, or that the plaintiff assumed the risk for the injuries. 
(3) If the defendant meets its burden of showing negligence or 
assumption of risk on the part of the plaintiff, liability is precluded unless 
the plaintiff can prove that a feasible alternative design could have 
 
 196. See generally Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938). 
 197. See supra notes 112–36 and accompanying text.  
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prevented the injury. 
 This proposed regime of products liability avoids the confusion 
and difficulty of defining defective product designs that plagued both of 
the Restatements. Instead, it incorporates components of each 
Restatement into separate stages of the plaintiff’s burden of production. 
The plaintiff’s initial burden relies on the consumer expectations test of 
the Restatement (Second). If the manufacturer shifts the burden back 
through an applicable defense, the plaintiff must prove a reasonable 
alternative design as prescribed by the Restatement (Third). 
B. Foreseeability Rather than Defect 
Both Restatements impose liability for defectively designed 
products.198 However, liability is limited to defective products.199 
Manufacturers of non-defective products—even if they cause harm—are 
not liable.200 This limitation contrasts with traditional strict liability. 
Traditional strict liability “is liability in tort, imposed on an actor” 
(including a manufacturer of a product) “for the harms the actor causes, 
regardless of whether or not the actor was negligent.”201 Therefore, 
traditional strict products liability would not hinge on whether the 
product was defective, but rather, whether the product caused the injury. 
Although product defect is not an essential attribute to a products 
liability regime, without any limitations, traditional strict liability would 
hamper designs and be unduly burdensome on manufacturers.202 
However, a strict liability regime with specific limitations, like those 
outlined in my proposal, presents a more predictable and fairer standard 
than a remedial scheme that pivots on the elusive task of defining a 
product defect. 
Even under a traditional strict products liability regime, liability is 
not unlimited.203 Rather, liability only follows from foreseeable injuries.204 
Under my proposal, like traditional strict liability, liability will only 
follow from foreseeable use of a product. For example, a lawn mower 
manufacturer would be liable for any injuries caused by the product used 
while mowing one’s lawn. However, the manufacturer would not be 
liable for injuries caused from the unforeseeable use of the lawn 
mower—such as where the mower was used in an attempt to break down 
 
 198. Restatement (Third) of Torts: Prods. Liab. § 2 (1998); Restatement (Second) of Torts 
§ 402A (1965). 
 199. See Restatement (Third) of Torts: Prods. Liab. § 2 (1998); Restatement (Second) of Torts 
§ 402A (1965); see also Twerski & Henderson, supra note 4, at 1066. 
 200. Twerski & Henderson, supra note 4, at 1066. 
 201. James A. Henderson, Jr., Why Negligence Dominates Tort, 50 UCLA L. Rev. 377, 380 (2002). 
 202. See id. at 397. 
 203. See Diamond, supra note 25, at 529 n.2. 
 204. Id. 
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fire wood into kindling. Moreover, even if a fact-finder concluded that 
using a lawn mower in such a manner was a foreseeable use—or 
misuse—of the product, the manufacturer would be shielded from 
liability based on negligent use of the product, as discussed below.205 
A plaintiff could show a product was used foreseeably in a variety of 
ways. Sometimes foreseeable use will be apparent based on the obvious 
nature of the product.206 Like the Restatement (Second), this inquiry 
considers objective consumer expectations about how the product is 
used. However, the inquiry into whether a product was used foreseeably 
does not ignore manufacturer conduct. For example, industry experience 
and the way the product is portrayed also shape consumer expectations.207 
In contrast to the Restatement (Second), which analyzed consumer 
expectations to determine product defect, under my proposal, consumer 
expectations are used to determine whether or not the use of the product 
was foreseeable. While consumers may be ill informed about the 
intricacies of how a product is designed, they have clear expectations 
about how a product is used.208 
It is worth noting, foreseeable uses of a product are distinguishable 
from foreseeable risks of a product.209 Negligence liability restrains 
liability based on foreseeable risks; however, strict products liability 
holds sellers and manufacturers liable regardless of whether they 
exercised all possible care in the preparation and sale of the product.210 
For example, cancer may not have been a foreseeable risk of exposure to 
asbestos at the time it was manufactured; however, because cancer may 
develop from a foreseeable use of asbestos products, under my proposal, 
liability follows. 
C. Available Affirmative Defenses: Negligent Use and Assumption 
of Risk 
My proposed regime would hold manufacturers liable for 
unforeseeable injuries caused by their products, so long as the product 
was used in a foreseeable way. Therefore, even if a manufacturer 
exercises reasonable care in the design of the product, they still may be 
exposed to liability. However, this expansion of liability, is limited 
through two affirmative defenses: negligent use and assumption of risk. 
Under my proposal, extreme misuse of a product would likely be 
unforeseeable and therefore would shield the manufacturer from 
 
 205. See infra Part III.C. 
 206. Stewart, supra note 60, at 1053. 
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 208. See Mark A. Geistfeld, The Value of Consumer Choice in Products Liability, 74 Brook. L. 
Rev. 781, 783 (2009). 
 209. Stewart, supra note 60, at 1053. 
 210. Id. 
Meade_62-HLJ-155.doc (Do Not Delete) 1/7/2011 12:02 PM 
November 2010]        A REASONABLE ALTERNATIVE 177 
liability. However, even if the misuse of a product is foreseeable, a 
manufacturer could preclude liability by showing that the plaintiff 
unreasonably or negligently used the product. Similar to the doctrine of 
contributory negligence, recovery for injuries caused by the negligent use 
of a product—even if foreseeable—would preclude recovery. 
Similarly, the defense of assumption of risk would be available to 
defendants. Under the doctrine of assumption of risk, when dangers are 
apparent, the defendant does not owe a duty to protect the plaintiff.211 
Therefore, under my proposal, when consumers are injured by products 
with open and obvious dangers, a defendant will avoid liability if it can 
be shown that the plaintiff assumed the risk.212 
While the defenses of negligent use and assumption of risk in the 
products liability context help avoid unwarranted manufacturer liability, 
the defenses also introduce the shortcomings of the consumer 
expectations test. Specifically, products with open and obvious dangers 
invite defenses of negligent use and assumption of risk that would bar a 
plaintiff from recovering when safer products were available. 
D. Evidence of a Reasonable Alternative Design as an Alternate 
Route to Recovery 
To avoid these pitfalls, under my proposal, once the affirmative 
defenses of negligent use or assumption of risk are proven by the 
defendant, the plaintiff can still introduce risk-utility evidence, showing a 
feasible alternative design was available, and therefore, that it was 
unreasonable to place the product on the market. This concept borrows 
directly from the Restatement (Third), in that if plaintiffs can show a 
reasonable alternative design was available, they can recover despite 
their own negligence or misuse of the product, assuming the reasonable 
alternative design would have adequately protected them against their 
own negligent use. 
Unlike the Restatement (Third), which places the initial burden of 
proving a reasonable alternative design on the plaintiff,213 my proposal 
only enables the introduction of risk-utility evidence and evidence of a 
reasonable alternative design after the defendant has successfully raised 
an affirmative defense of negligent use or assumption of risk. In the 
 
 211. Knight v. Jewett, 834 P.2d 696, 707 (Cal. 1992). 
 212. States have differing standards over the scope of assumption of risk as an affirmative defense. 
See Harvey S. Perlman, Products Liability Reform in Congress: An Issue of Federalism, 48 Ohio St. 
L.J. 503, 506 (1987). Clearly, a lack of uniformity regarding the affirmative defense hinders forming a 
uniform products liability regime. For the purposes of this proposal, assumption of risk is considered a 
question of fact for the jury and is available as an affirmative defense when “a plaintiff has voluntarily 
and intelligently undertaken an activity which he knows to be hazardous in ways which subsequently 
cause him injury.” Howell v. Clyde, 620 A.2d 1107, 1112 (Pa. 1993). 
 213. Twerski & Henderson, supra note 4, at 1069. 
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context of a strict liability regime, the initial burden is properly placed on 
the defendant once the plaintiff shows the product caused the injury. 
E. A Note Regarding Bystanders 
Like the Restatement (Second) and the Restatement (Third), under 
my proposal, injuries to bystanders will not preclude liability to the 
product manufacturer. Like a direct injury to the product user, a 
bystander can make out a prima facie case for strict products liability by 
showing the foreseeable use of the product caused the injury to the 
bystander. The affirmative defenses available to defendants will still be 
available if the bystander’s own negligence caused her injury, or she 
assumed the risk of being a bystander. For example, a fan at a baseball 
game, hit by a foul ball, likely assumed the risk associated with attending 
the game. 
Hypothetically, if a product user’s negligent use of a product injured 
a bystander, and the bystander did not assume the risk, the defense 
would not be available to preclude the manufacturer’s liability for the 
bystander’s injuries. However, the manufacturer would be able to limit 
liability through indemnification of the negligent product user. 
Under my proposal, in the case of Berrier, the bystander child 
injured by the lawn mower could set forth a prima facie case of strict 
liability. It is certainly possible the defendant manufacturer could raise 
an affirmative defense of assumption of risk pertaining to the child 
bystander,214 but assuming they are unsuccessful, the defendant 
manufacturer could also indemnify the user of the lawn mower based on 
negligent use of the lawn mower. This would not preclude recovery on 
behalf of the bystander, but would serve as a limitation on the 
manufacturer’s liability. Of course, if the manufacturer successfully 
showed negligent use on the part of the product user, the product user 
could still introduce evidence that a reasonable alternative design would 
have avoided the injury. In the case of Berrier, even if the manufacturer 
showed the lawn mower user was negligent in backing over the child, the 
user could still show that back-over protection, or a “no mow in reverse” 
device would have avoided the injury all together. 
F. Justifications for the Proposal 
Imposing strict liability based on foreseeable use of a product, while 
allowing a manufacturer a defense of negligent use or assumption of risk, 
avoids the shortcomings of defining product defect that plagued the 
Restatement (Second) and the Restatement (Third). My proposal avoids 
the deficiencies of the consumer expectations test, because consumer 
 
 214. An assumption of risk defense is available even when a child is injured, so long as they were 
aware of the dangers and accepted the risk. Long v. Manzo, 682 A.2d 370, 374 (Pa. Super. 1996). 
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expectations about product use are more easily discernable than 
consumer expectations about a product’s design. Additionally, products 
with open and obvious dangers will not escape liability, because injuries 
caused by the foreseeable use of the products—whether the danger is 
open and obvious or not—will still trigger liability. Defendants, 
especially manufacturers of products with open and obvious dangers, will 
rightfully raise a defense, such as negligent use or assumption of risk; 
however, plaintiffs injured by unreasonably dangerous products will still 
be able to recover by showing that a reasonable alternative design would 
have prevented the injury. 
My proposal avoids the shortcomings of the Restatement (Third), 
because it retains a standard of strict liability, without collapsing the 
standard into negligence. Once a prima facie case of liability is 
established through an injury caused by the foreseeable use of the 
product, the burden is on the defendant to show the plaintiff acted 
unreasonably. This conforms to the purpose of strict products liability, 
namely that manufacturers “insure that the costs of injuries resulting 
from . . . products are borne by the manufacturers that put such products 
on the market rather than by the injured persons who are powerless to 
protect themselves.”215 Despite extending liability without regard for 
fault, my proposal protects manufacturers because they are not required 
to compensate plaintiffs for injuries resulting from the unforeseeable use 
of a product. Moreover the defenses of negligent use and assumption of 
risk provide defendants with additional protection from liability. 
Expanding liability to all products, regardless of defect, would shift 
the true costs of products onto manufacturers rather than onto victims of 
a product that causes injury.216 Undoubtedly, manufacturers would shift 
the increased costs to the consumer in the form of higher prices.217 
Nevertheless, the higher prices would reflect the total costs of a product 
that causes injury to the consumer.218 Consumers would respond to 
higher prices by foregoing purchasing products that regularly cause 
injuries. For example, any lawn mower that caused injuries would be 
more expensive due to the added liability costs. Safer lawn mowers, 
however—perhaps with “no mow in reverse” technology—would be 
relatively cheaper. Consumers would be driven to the lower priced, safer 
products. My proposal’s regime of strict liability for all products reflects 
the true costs of the product and thereby encourages the socially 
appropriate level of consumption. 
 
 215. Greenman v. Yuba Power Prods., Inc., 377 P.2d 897, 901 (Cal. 1963). 
 216. See Diamond, supra note 25, at 531. 
 217. Id. 
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G. Criticisms of the Proposal 
Some have argued strict products liability has expanded to its peak, 
and further expansion of no-fault liability is institutionally impossible for 
the courts to implement.219 It is worth noting that strict liability already 
applies in a number of significant areas. The worker’s compensation 
system is based on strict liability.220 Additionally, traditional strict liability 
applies to commercial enterprises engaged in abnormally dangerous 
activities.221 Employer vicarious liability is also based on strict liability.222 
Lastly, products with manufacturing defects are essentially subject to 
traditional strict liability. Although a product must be deemed defective 
before liability without fault is imposed, determining defect is not 
difficult, because the product differs from other prototypes on the 
market. Liability for manufacturing defects therefore hinges on 
causation. 
Expanding strict liability to all products has been attacked on three 
specific grounds: (1) expanding strict liability creates categorical liability 
and will eliminate certain products from the market; (2) expanding strict 
liability raises problems in determining causation; and (3) expanding 
liability creates a moral hazard, as consumers will not avoid injury.223 
1. Categorical Liability 
Expanding liability to products without defect imposes categorical 
liability on all products.224 The Restatement (Third) requires proof of a 
reasonable alternative design specifically to avoid category liability.225 
The drafters were concerned that under a standard risk-utility test, a fact-
finder could conclude the risks associated with a product would outweigh 
the benefits—even if no alternative were available.226 Critics note this 
form of liability has not been embraced by American courts and was 
explicitly prohibited by the Restatement (Third).227 
Admittedly, under my proposed strict liability regime, products that 
cause injuries result in liability for the manufacturer. All products would 
be subject to liability—not just products deemed defective. Because no 
product can be made completely safe, nor would it be cost effective to do 
so even if possible, manufacturers will undoubtedly face higher liability 
costs. The consequences of categorical liability, however, are neither as 
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drastic nor as disastrous as commentary has argued. It is worth noting 
that categorical liability does not prohibit the sale or use of a product. 
Rather, it would establish liability for the injuries caused by the product. 
While the price of dangerous products might increase based on the 
injuries they cause, the increase in liability would reflect the true costs of 
the product. 
2. Causation 
The expansion of products liability has been criticized as posing 
difficult problems of determining causation.228 In a regime in which 
liability does not hinge on defect, whether the product caused the harm is 
central to whether a product manufacturer will be liable for injuries 
associated with the product. 
Professor James Henderson, a reporter for the Restatement (Third), 
argued expanding strict liability beyond defective products was 
unworkable, because determining whether a product caused an injury 
would place too heavy a burden on the courts.229 As an example, 
Henderson posed a hypothetical accident in which a plaintiff, after eating 
a heavy lunch of pasta and drinking two bottles of beer, climbed upstairs 
to retrieve a book from his bedroom.230 On the way downstairs to answer 
the door, while glancing at his book, the plaintiff tripped on a roller skate 
left by his daughter, fell down the stairs, and crashed through the glass 
screen of the television.231 Henderson argued that the hypothetical 
implicated too many defendants, and if liability were imposed without 
defects, each product mentioned could be liable for the plaintiff’s 
resulting injury.232 
Certainly a products liability regime that imposed limitless liability 
on the hypothetical defendants would be undesirable. However, under 
my proposed strict liability regime, liability is limited to injuries caused 
by a product’s foreseeable use. This would eliminate any liability of the 
television manufacturer and the roller skate manufacturer, because 
neither of those products caused the injury during the course of 
foreseeable use. Similarly, the plaintiff would have a difficult time 
showing the beer, pasta, and book were proximate causes of the injury. 
Proximate cause is undoubtedly an elusive concept,233 but if foreseeability 
can limit the duty of care in negligence actions, there is no reason why it 
cannot be determined in products liability cases. Finally, any of the 
hypothetical defendants could raise an affirmative defense that the 
plaintiff acted negligently in using the product, or assumed the risk of 
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using the product. If a fact-finder concluded leaving the roller skate on 
the staircase was unreasonable, the manufacturers of the staircase and of 
the roller skate would be precluded from liability. In the posed 
hypothetical, when analyzed under my proposal, a plaintiff would be 
required to show safer, reasonable alternative designs were available—
which is exactly the standard Professor Henderson and the Restatement 
(Third) advocate.234 
Complex products liability cases, whether the regime requires a 
defect or not, will undoubtedly arise. Like in negligence actions, in a 
strict liability regime, proving causation rests with the plaintiff.235 That 
said, if multiple products, used in a foreseeable way, cause injury, liability 
should ensue for all of the products. The task of determining causation 
can be difficult, but this does not justify imposing a defect requirement in 
order to establish liability. 
3. Moral Hazard 
Expanding strict liability has also been attacked as inviting moral 
hazard—“the natural tendency for insureds to increase their risks of 
incurring covered losses by risky conduct after the insurance takes 
effect.”236 The argument contends that expanding strict products liability 
invites riskier behavior, because losses are spread to everyone through a 
higher priced product.237 This encourages careless use of a product by 
those who would use expanded liability as insurance, while risk-averse 
consumers will choose not to consume the product, because they are 
forced to pay an increased price and would not benefit from the increase 
in insurance.238 
As applied to my proposal, this argument suffers from two flaws. 
First, limiting liability to foreseeable use of a product greatly diminishes 
the ability to use products in injury-prone ways while still imposing 
liability on the manufacturer. Additionally, the affirmative defenses of 
negligent use and assumption of risk serve as a check on risky behavior 
because certain uses of a product will preclude recovery for the plaintiff. 
Second, the argument fails to acknowledge the effect that expanded 
liability would have on manufacturers. Even assuming expanded liability 
invites riskier behavior on the part of consumers, it also encourages safer 
behavior on the part of manufacturers. Strict liability is liability without 
fault, but expanding liability will still change behavior, because 
manufacturers will include liability as a cost of doing business.239 This 
encourages manufacturers to market their products responsibly and to 
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sell their products to safe users.240 Whether savings due to the decline in 
injuries because of manufacturer safety precautions would offset any 
increase in consumer risk based on a moral hazard is an empirical 
question. However the possibility of consumer moral hazard alone 
should not dissuade experimentation in strict products liability regimes. 
Expanding liability to products without defects does not pose a 
significant moral hazard, because liability is limited to foreseeable use of 
a product and an affirmative defense of consumer negligence discourages 
misuse of a product. Additionally, any increase in injuries resulting from 
risky behavior on the part of consumers must be balanced against risk-
averse behavior on the part of manufacturers. 
Conclusion 
More than ten years after the publication of the Restatement 
(Third), controversy persists over the appropriate standard of design 
defects. Nowhere is the controversy more unsettled than in Pennsylvania, 
where a recent decision by the Third Circuit produced a split between 
state and federal courts applying Pennsylvania law. Currently, in 
products liability cases, federal courts apply the Restatement (Third), 
while Pennsylvania state courts continue to apply the Restatement 
(Second). The division in Pennsylvania is characteristic of the rest of the 
country, in which different states apply drastically different standards to 
define product defect. 
This division presents an opportunity to clarify the law, not only in 
Pennsylvania, but also throughout the country. Rather than follow either 
the Restatement (Second) or the Restatement (Third), which have led to 
the current division, courts and legislatures should apply a form of strict 
liability that holds manufacturers of products liable when the foreseeable 
use of the product causes an injury. Plaintiffs should only have to 
produce evidence of a reasonable alternative design after the defendant 
has proven negligent use or assumption of risk. By eliminating the 
elusive concept of defect from a products liability regime, liability will be 
more predictable and will better reflect the true costs of product use. 
Courts have struggled to develop a standard that realizes the 
purpose of strict products liability, without overburdening manufacturers 
or underprotecting consumers. Neither the Restatement (Second), nor 
the Restatement (Third) was successful in defining design defects. If the 
term “defect” lacks a coherent definition, it should not trigger liability. 
This Note proposes removing defect as a requirement for liability. 
Ultimately, this Note seeks to further the discussion towards developing 
a just and unified standard of products liability law. 
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